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Interest Rate Risk and Bank
Capital Standards
Considerable attention recently has focused on
the interest rate risk exposure ofu.s. banks. This
new-found attention is due in part to a provision
in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDIClA) that requires
federal banking regulators to incorporate interest
rate risk into bank capital standards by the mid-
dle of 1993. In their current form the risk-based
capital requirements focus on the credit risk of
bank assets, requiring banks to hold more capital
against assets assumed to pose agreater risk of
default. Although most observers believe that
interest rate risk is iessimportant for banks than
credit risk, this omission may mean that bank
capital levels do not accurately reflect the true
risk of bank portfolios.
The Federal Reserve Board has responded to the
requirements of FDICIA by proposing a frame-
work for addressing interest risk in bank capital
standards. In this Letter, I provide some back-
ground on the notion of interest rate risk, and
describe the general features ofthe Fed's pro-
posal. I also compare this proposal to an alterna-
tive met~odologyproposed by thrift regulators.
What is interest rate risk?
Interest rate risk refers to the (possibly adverse)
effect that changes in interest rates can have on
the values of bank assets and liabilities. Financial
instrumentstypicallyprovide astream ofpayments
that is fixed in nominal terms for a period oftime.
The fixed-payment period may be relatively short,
such as for a Treasury bill or an adjustable-rate
mortgage loan, or long, as with a long-term bond
or a fixed-rate mortgage loan. When market in-
terest rates change, the value offinancial instru-
ments changes as well. An increase in market
rates during the fixed-payment period diminishes
the value ofthe fixed stream of payments and
thus reduces the market value of the instrument.
A decline in rates, in contrast, raises the value of
the fixed payment stream.
In general, the longer the period during which
the payments are fixed, the greater the relative
change in value from a given change in both
short- and long-term interest rates. Thus, the mar-
ket value of a long-term bond or a 3D-year fixed-
rate mortgage is more sensitive to a parallel shift
in interest rates than a short-term debt security or
an adjustable-rate mortgage.
The impact of a change in interest rates on the
value of a bank depends on the maturity struc-
ture of both its assets and its liabilities. If the
fixed payments the bank receives from its assets
take longer to respondto interest rate changes
than the fixed payments it makes on its liabilities,
then a rise in interest rates would reduce the
value of assets more than the value of liabilities,
and the bank's net worth would fall. In practice,
most banks have a liability side of the balance
sheet that carries a shorter repricing period than
the asset side. That is, they typically borrow short
and lend long. Thus, a certain amount of interest
rate risk appears to be a normal part ofthe busi-
ness of banking.
If exposure to interest rate risk is high, then an
unfavorable move in interest rates could signifi-
cantly reduce an institution's net worth and eat
into its capital cushion. In extreme cases, an
adverse move in interest rates could reduce an
institution's capital below the level required by
regulators. This is what happened to many thrifts
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Concerns
about a repeat of this episode have prompted
efforts to identify banks facing significant interest
rate risk, and to require them to hold more capi-
tal against the possibility of large interest rate-
induced declines in value.
How do you measure it?
As the preceding discussion suggests, the inter-
est rate risk associated with any financial instru-
ment is directly related to the length oftime over
which the instrument makes fixed payments.
One commonly used measure ofthe "length" or
effective maturity of a financial instrument is its
duration. The duration of a financial asset is the
weighted average maturity of its cash flows,FRBSF
where the present values ofthe cash flows (as
a percent of total present value) serve as the
weights. For example, a financial asset that
makes a fixed nominal payment every year for
ten years has a duration somewhat less than five
years. This is because the asset pays more of its
present value in the first five years than itdoes
in the second five years; the present discounted
value of the fixed payments received far in the
future is less than the present value of payments
received earlier. In contrast, the duration of a ten-
year zero-coupon bond (which makes no pay-
ments until maturity) is equal to ten years since
100 percent ofthe present value of its cash flows
are received at maturity. In practice, it is typical
to adjust an instrument's duration for noncon-
. tinuous compounding of interest, yielding the
more commonly used measure known as modi-
fied duration.
The duration measure is particuiariy useful as a
gauge of interest rate risk. The longer the dura-
tion of an asset or liability, the more its value will
change in response to a given percentage point
change in both short- and long-term market in-
terest rates. A 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, for
example, has a relatively long duration. The value
of this asset fluctuates more from a parallel shift
in the yield curve than a shorter duration asset,
such as a short-term consumer loan. The concept
of duration can be applied to both the assets and·
liabilities of a gank's balance sheet; a weighted
average of these individual durations yields a
single measure ofthe exposure of the bank's net
worth to changes in interest rates. The measure-
ment system proposed by the Federal Reserve
uses this method to assess interest rate risk.
The Fed's proposal
Any system intended to measure the interest rate
risk of bank portfolios requires information on
the maturity structure of bank assets and liabil-
ities. Thus, the Fed's proposal requires banks to
assign their on- and off-balance sheet assetsand
their liabilities to one of six time bands based
either on the maturity ofthe instrument or (for
floating rate instruments) on the length of time
until its interest rate adjusts.
in addition to the maturity information, the Fed's
proposed system also requires banks to assign
their assets to one ofthree categories: amortiz-
ing, nonamortizing, and deep discount. Amortiz-
ing assets make periodic payments of both prin-
cipal and interest, while nonamortizing assets
pay interest only, delaying principal repayment
until maturity. Deep discount assets make neither
interest nor principal payments but instead are
sold at a discount from face value and then repay
principal at maturity. These differences in cash
flow characteristics affect the duration of the dif-
ferent types of assets. For a given maturity, an
amortizing asset has a shorter duration than a
nonamortizing one, which in turn has a shorter
duration than a deep discount asset.
Each bank reports to the regulators its dollar
positions in each of the time bands for the three
different types of assets and for liabilities. These
reported positions are then multiplied by "risk
weights" that are derived from the durations of
the corresponding assets and liabilities. The risk
weights are expressed in percent terms and rep-
resent the change in the value of an instrument
resulting from a 100 basis point (one percentage
point) change in aii interest rates. The resuit of
this multiplication is a series of risk-weighted
positions that measure the change in the value
ofthe bank's reported holdings that would follow
a 100 basis point change in interest rates. For
example, multiplying the bank's holdings of long-
term fixed rate mortgage loans by the appropri-
ate amortizing risk weight yields a number that
represents the change in the value ofthe bank's
mortgage holdings resulting from a 100 basis
point change in all rates.
Finally, total risk-weighted liabilities are sub-
tracted from total risk-weighted assets to arrive at
the net risk-weighted position ofthe bank. This
number, expressed in dollars, is the change in
the net worth ofthe bank that would occur as a
result of a 100 basis point shift in interest rates.
Alternatively, this net risk-weighted position can
be expressed as a percent oftotal assets. In this
way, the interest rate risk of different banks can
be compared easily, just as bank capital ratios
are compared.
Normal vs. excessive interest rate risk
One guiding principle of the fed's proposal is
that a certain amount of interest rate risk is in-
herent in banking. Moreover, creditrisk is con-
sidered to be significantly more important than
interest rate risk in terms of the threat it poses to
bank solvency. The Fed's proposal suggests that
existing risk-based capital requirements are suf-
ficient to cover "normal" levels of interest rate
risk. Banks that have "normal" interest rate risk
will not be required under the proposed systemto hold additional capital. Only those institutions
that are exposed to "excessive" risk would be
required to hold more capital.
The obvious next question is what constitutes
excessive risk. To answer this question, Fed re-
searchers look to the historical distribution of
banking industry risk exposures. Applying the
proposed measurement system to the recent ex-
perience of u.s. banks suggests that a net risk-
weighted position equal to 1 percent of a bank's
assets may be considered "normaL" That is, the
"normal" change in the net worth of a bank
arising from a 100 basis point change in all in-
terest rates is 1 percent of assets. Drawing on this
result, the Fed proposal suggests that any bank
with anetrisk-weighted position equal to1percent
of assets or less would not be required to hold
additional capital over and above the existing
risk-based capital requirements. Only exposures
in excess of 1 percent would require additional
capital, which would be equal to the amount in
excess ofthe 1 percent risk exposure.
Some pros and cons
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tern for measuring interest rate risk. The system
balances the need to obtain information to meas-
ure interest rate exposures with a desire to mini-
mize the additional reporting burden for banks.
While the proposal calls for expanded reporting
of asset types and maturity structures, banks are
not required to report detailed yield information
on individual assets. Ideally, asset-specific yield
and coupon ·information would be required to
obtain more accurate duration-based risk factors.
Instead, the Fed's proposal uses representative
bank assets to derive the risk weights. This ap-
proach also neglects asset-specific information
like prepayment options and may fail to capture
unusual characteristics of new financialinstru-
ments. This compromise reduces the accuracy of
the final risk measure but also reduces the bank's
reporting burden.
The Fed's approach differs somewhat from one
proposed last year for thrifts by the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS). The OTS would require
thrifts to report maturity information and cash
flow characteristics of assets and liabilities, as
well as instrument-specific information on yield,
coupon, prepayment options, and so on. This
more detailed method would then simulate the
impact of a 200 basis point shift in all interest
rates, requiring thrifts to hold additional capital
equal to a portion of the simulated change in net
worth.
How different are these two approaches? The
OTS method provides a more accurate measure
ofthe interest rate sensitivity of net worth, and
thus of interest rate risk. However, it also imposes
a considerable reporting burden on thrifts. Since
little work has been done to assess the differ-
ences between the two approaches, it is unclear
whether the additional reporting requirements of
the OTS proposal are worth the cost. Some pre-
liminary work comparing the two methods on a
sample of thrifts suggests that the two methodol-
ogies largely agree on identifying high interest
rate risk institutions. Differences arise between
the two approaches when considering institutions
with more moderate levels of interest rate risk.
Conclusion
Some measure of interest rate riskwill become a
reality for the nation's financial intermediaries in
the next year, though the exact form of this meas-
ure is not yet known. Moreover, this measure will
be linked to risk-based capital standards. Some
have argued that the failure of the current system
to address interest rate risk creates an incentive
for banks and thrifts to substitute interest rate risk
for credit risk by altering the composition of their
portfolios. Recent large increases in bank hold-
ings of Treasury securities, it is claimed, are
consistent with this incentive.
Of course, the rather simple systems proposed by
regulators should not preclude the use by bank
management of more sophisticated interest rate
risk monitoring mechanisms. Institutions that take
big interest rate risk exposures should already be
aware of the nature oftheir positions and the
risks they pose to net worth.
J9nathan A. Neuberger
Economist
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